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Holding non-state actors to 
account for constitutional 
economic and social rights 
violations: Experiences and 
lessons from South Africa and 
Ireland
Aoife Nolan*
The horizontal application of  human rights to non-state actors (NSA) is an evolving and 
contested legal area both comparatively and at the international level. In light of  this, the 
article discusses mechanisms by which NSA who violate constitutional economic and social 
rights (ESR) may be held directly accountable by ESR-holders. Its central focus is the hori-
zontal application of  constitutional ESR protections to private relationships, where neither 
party has a state/public function or state nexus. The article reviews developments in two 
domestic constitutional systems, those of  Ireland and South Africa, in order to demonstrate 
and explain the different approaches that have been adopted to the issue of  horizontality by 
both the constitutional drafters and the courts in those jurisdictions. It employs this compar-
ative analysis to explore many of  the key normative objections that have traditionally been 
raised under liberal constitutional theory in relation to the application of  human rights obli-
gations—and those imposed by ESR in particular—to NSA. The article concludes with an 
evaluation of  the effectiveness of  the Irish and South African legal models and approaches in 
terms of  holding NSA liable for violations of  ESR, outlining key lessons that these national 
experiences have for the direct horizontal application of  ESR at the international level.
* Professor of  International Human Rights Law, School of  Law, University of  Nottingham. Email: aoife.
nolan@nottingham.ac.uk. Thanks are owed to Colm O’Cinneide, Rory O’Connell and Conor Gearty who pro-
vided very helpful comments on earlier drafts of  this paper. This article reflects the law as it stood at the date 
of  acceptance of  this piece (7 February 2013). The article does not reflect the changes to Article 42 of  the 
Irish Constitution that would result from the Thirty-First Amendment of  the Constitution (Children) 2012 
coming into force. Although approved by referendum in November 2012, that amendment has not yet come 
into force due to ongoing litigation in relation to the way in which the referendum process was conducted. 
See most recently: In the Matter of  the Referendum on the Proposal for the Amendment to the Constitution 
contained in the Thirty-First Amendment to the Constitution (Children) Bill 2012 [2013] IEHC 485.
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1. Introduction
Across the globe, providers of  key goods and services that relate to economic and 
social rights (ESR) are ever more likely to be non-state actors (NSA),1 while the power 
and influence of  NSA such as multinational corporations, international financial 
institutions, and non-governmental organizations are increasing. This reality has led 
to growing concern, internationally and domestically, about the role of  such actors in 
relation to the realization of  ESR, including the impact that their actions (and omis-
sions to act) may have on the enjoyment of  such rights.
This article will discuss mechanisms by which NSA who violate constitutional ESR 
may be held directly accountable by ESR-holders. Its central focus will be the direct 
horizontal application of  constitutional ESR protections to private relationships, 
where neither party has a state/public function or state nexus. I will review develop-
ments in two domestic constitutional systems, those of  Ireland and South Africa, in 
order to demonstrate the different approaches that have been adopted to the issue of  
horizontality by both the drafters of  the constitutions and the courts in those jurisdic-
tions. This comparative analysis will explore many of  the key normative objections 
that have traditionally been raised under liberal constitutional theory in relation to 
the application of  human rights obligations—and those imposed by ESR in particu-
lar—to non-state actors.2 These include alleged “objections from democracy” and 
claims about the impact of  the direct horizontal application of  rights on the values 
of  liberty, autonomy, and privacy.3 I evaluate the effectiveness of  these domestic legal 
models and approaches in terms of  holding NSA liable for violations of  ESR, drawing 
1 There have been numerous attempts to define “non-state actors.” With regard to economic, social, and 
cultural rights context, the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has said that 
relevant NSA that may interfere with the enjoyment of  ESR include “individuals, groups, corporations 
and other entities as well as agents acting under their authority.” See UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, Right to water (2002), ¶ 23. The definitions of  some 
commentators include a requirement that a non-state actor must engage in transnational relations. See, 
e.g., the definition of  Josselin and Wallace critiqued by Philip Alston, The Not-a-cat Syndrome: Can the 
International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NoN-State actorS aNd HumaN rigHtS 
1, 15–16 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). However, I prefer to follow the broader approach of  the CESCR as its 
definition captures both non-state actors that operate solely in one jurisdiction, as well as those with a 
transnational element to their activities. In this article, I will use the term “private actor” as synonymous 
with NSA.
2 A wide range of  objections have been raised to the legitimacy of  the direct horizontal application of  ESR. 
These are premised on both international law and features of  particular domestic frameworks. Other 
arguments center on the efficacy of  the application of  human rights standards to relationships between 
private actors in terms of  ensuring effective protection of  ESR. In this article, I will focus primarily on 
those legitimacy-related arguments that are based on liberal constitutional theory. Obviously, the rel-
evance of  such arguments will vary depending on the domestic constitutional framework at issue and 
I am not suggesting that the issues dealt with in this article will be equally relevant to every jurisdiction.
3 For useful examples of  argumentation based on alleged objections to the direct application of  ESR to NSA 
from liberal constitutional theory, see Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne, Du Plessis is Not Dead: South 
Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of  the Bill of  Rights to Private Disputes, 15(1) S. afr. J. Hum. 
rtS 25 (1999); and Halton Cheadle & Dennis Davis, The Application of  the 1996 Constitution in the Private 
Sphere, 13 S. afr. J. Hum. rtS 44 (1997).
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conclusions with regard to lessons that the successes and shortcomings of  the Irish 
and South African constitutional experiences have for the direct horizontal applica-
tion of  ESR at the international level. 4
The idea of  holding NSA accountable for rights violations is highly topical, and 
there is a growing body of  literature on the subject, much of  which refers to the 
South African experience and a small amount of  which addresses the Irish jurispru-
dence, albeit frequently only in a cursory way.5 So far, however, there has been no 
systematic comparison of  these legal orders with regard to the horizontal applica-
tion of  constitutional ESR. Nor has the horizontal application of  constitutional ESR 
(as opposed to constitutional rights generally) in Irish constitutional law been fully 
explored. This article seeks to address these lacunae. The article also contributes 
to broader debates about the extent to which ESR can—or should—be horizontally 
applicable, directly addressing the question of  the horizontality of  the positive obli-
gations imposed by ESR—a debate that has not yet been fully played out either in the 
courts or in academic literature. Finally, the piece feeds into the evolving discussion 
on the direct horizontal application of  ESR at the international level, highlighting 
how the South African and Irish experiences can and should influence develop-
ments in this area.
There are other reasons why the survey proposed here is valuable and necessary. 
First, while the Irish Constitution is the oldest in Europe and largely predates the inter-
national discourses on human rights (including ESR) and horizontality, the South 
African Constitution of  1996 was heavily (and self-consciously) influenced by both 
of  those factors. Second, in contrast to the very limited recognition of  ESR under the 
Irish Constitution, the South African Constitution enshrines a broad range of  ESR. 
Third, unlike the Irish position, where horizontal application occurred as a result of  
judicial decision-making as opposed to express textual prescription, the drafters of  the 
South African 1996 Constitution explicitly embraced horizontality. A consideration 
of  these two constitutional experiences therefore serves as an excellent framework 
for a discussion of  both the theory and practice of  the direct horizontal application 
of  ESR. In addition to highlighting precisely where the Irish and the South African 
Courts stand on the issue of  the horizontal application of  ESR and explaining why this 
is so, it is crucial that attention should be focused on the forthcoming developments 
in this field in those jurisdictions. This is especially important given the implications 
that the “local” protection of  human rights may have for their “global” protection in 
this context.
4 For a discussion of  the liability of  NSA under regional and international human rights law, see, e.g., 
Jan A. Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of  Non-State Actors, 11 Buff. Hum. rtS 
L. rev. 21 (2005); John Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 am. J. iNt’L L. 1, 1 n. 86 (2008); Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo, The Applicability of  International Human Rights Law to Non-State Actors: What Relevance to 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?, 12(5) iNt’L J. Hum. rtS 725 (2008).
5 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of  Constitutional Rights, 102 micH. L. rev. 387, 396 
(2003) where the extensive Irish experience is summed up in two paragraphs.
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2. Horizontality and ESR
When researching in this area, one is immediately struck by the similarity between the 
arguments made against the direct horizontal application of  human/constitutional 
rights and those made in relation to the constitutionalization or adjudication of  legally 
binding ESR. One circumstantial reason for this is the fact that such assertions are 
frequently proffered in the context of  discussions of  the South African Constitution, 
which provides for both horizontality and ESR. The second, weightier, reason is that 
giving effect to horizontality and ESR by the courts will frequently require redistribu-
tion and the alteration of  the status quo both in terms of  the allocation of  power and 
other resources and in terms of  pre-existing legal frameworks and relationships. Thus, 
both ESR and horizontality raise similar concerns for those who argue that decisions 
in relation to distribution and law-making should be the sole preserve of  democrati-
cally elected representatives.
A key element of  both the Irish and the South African experiences is a rejection 
of  the notion that the judicial horizontal application of  ESR is absolutely barred as it 
requires “a political choice” which should be taken by the elected branches of  govern-
ment, rather than a judicial elite. This relates to the notion of  the “counter-majoritar-
ian objection” to what is perceived as “excessive” judicial activity—a central aspect of  
liberal constitutional theory.6 In fact, opposition to the horizontal application of  rights 
on the grounds that such activity is undemocratic is generally symptomatic of  a more 
fundamental discomfiture with the broader conception of  judicial review of  the action 
of  politically accountable representatives per se, rather than being specific to ESR adju-
dication or the horizontality context.7 In this context, it is worth recalling that where 
a constitution has been adopted by an electorate (as the Irish Constitution was) or by 
a constitutional assembly (as occurred in South Africa), that instrument and its provi-
sions represent a political choice by the people.8 Where, as in the South African case, 
the Constitution expressly contains a commitment to horizontality, it cannot be argued 
that the application of  that provision by the courts in appropriate circumstances is ille-
gitimate. This is particularly so where, as under both the Irish and the South African 
constitutional frameworks, it is accepted that the courts are the final arbiters of  the 
constitution.9 The issue is admittedly more complex where, as in Ireland, the hori-
zontal application of  constitutional rights has occurred as a result of  judicial inter-
pretation of  constitutional provisions that make no explicit reference to horizontality. 
However, if, as in the Irish context, one accepts that the courts may legitimately identify 
6 For a discussion of  the “counter-majoritarian objection” to this kind of  judicial activism within consti-
tutional liberal theory, see aLexaNder BickeL, tHe LeaSt daNgerouS BraNcH—tHe Supreme court at tHe Bar of 
poLiticS (1962).
7 See, e.g., Sprigman & Osborne, supra note 3.
8 Stephen Ellman, Labor Law: A Constitutional Confluence: American “State Action”; Law and the Application of  
South Africa’s Socio-economic Rights Guarantees to Private Actors, 45 N.Y.L. ScH. L. rev. 21, 41, 42 (2001).
9 See S. afr. coNSt., 1996, § 167(3)(c), 167(7), available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/ 
constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014. For an illuminating discussion 
of  the Irish approach, see the statements of  Finlay CJ in Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] I.L.R.M. 400 at 449.
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unenunciated/implied rights and principles, there can be no absolute objection to the 
courts doing so in the context of  horizontal application in particular.
Nor is the objection to judicial horizontal application on the basis that it entails 
“judicial law-making”10 (and hence violates a formal (and contested) conception 
of  the separation of  powers according to which the legislature makes law and the 
courts apply that law to specific fact situations in the context of  resolving disputes 
between parties)11 exclusive to debates about horizontal application. While the hori-
zontal application of  rights by judges certainly seems to offer broad scope for judicial 
law-making, the same is true where the courts are involved in vertical application 
of  constitutional rights against the state and its actors—or indeed any situation in 
which courts delineate the precise content and scope of  constitutional rights which 
are expressed in a general way. Admittedly, such judicial law-making may be more 
likely in the context of  horizontal application of  constitutional rights due to the fact 
that constitutional guarantees have traditionally been perceived as, and formulated 
in terms of, determining relationships between states and citizens, rather than those 
between citizens. Crucially, however, the difference here is one of  degree, rather than 
of  principle. Hence, horizontality is not necessarily incompatible with the presump-
tions underlying liberal constitutional theory.
Nor will such judicial law-making, where it occurs, necessarily result in the disem-
powerment of  the legislature when it comes to regulating the relationships between 
private citizens. The fact that the courts may in some circumstances hold that rights 
have horizontal application (and the dearth of  cases involving such a finding in the 
South African context since 1997 as well as experiences in jurisdictions such as 
Germany, Canada and Colombia would seem to indicate that the courts will not rush 
to do so)12 will not serve to prevent legislatures from spelling out the horizontal scope 
of  the rights guarantees in legislation.13
Before moving on to consider the Irish and South African models of  horizontal 
application in practice, it is important to address (albeit briefly) objections to the hori-
zontality of  ESR that are founded on the alleged relative institutional incapacity of  the 
courts to apply ESR horizontally.14 Similar arguments in relation to judicial capacity 
10 For such a claim, see Cheadle & Davis, supra note 3, at 56.
11 For a discussion of  such an understanding of  the doctrine, see maurice viLe, coNStitutioNaLiSm aNd tHe 
SeparatioN of powerS 2 (1967). For an in-depth discussion of  the separation of  powers in the context of  
ESR adjudication, see aoife NoLaN, cHiLdreN’S Socio-ecoNomic rigHtS aNd tHe courtS ch. 4 (2011).
12 For a discussion of  the German and Canadian experiences, see Gardbaum, supra note 5. For a brief  dis-
cussion of  the Colombian experience, see Magdalena Sépulveda, Colombia: The Constitutional Court’s Role 
in Addressing Injustice, in SociaL rigHtS JuriSprudeNce: emergiNg treNdS iN comparative aNd iNterNatioNaL Law 
127, 146 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008).
13 While such legislation would be open to judicial review by the courts against judicially applied (and some-
times determined) constitutional standards, the same is true of  any legislation, including that relating to 
the vertical application of  rights.
14 For instance, Ellman argues that a potential result of  constitutionalizing spheres of  private activity may be 
damaging to the quality of  government decision-making. See Ellman, supra note 8, at 42. He states that it 
is reasonable to believe that elected political officials are, in general, better equipped than courts to make 
complex policy judgments and compromises such as those required by the horizontal application of  rights.
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have frequently been raised in debates surrounding the constitutionalization of  legally 
binding ESR.15 There is growing recognition, however, that such institutional con-
cerns are frequently overstated and there are a range of  models, mechanisms and 
remedies that courts can employ to ensure the effective adjudication of  ESR.16 There 
is no reason to assume that the same is not the case with regard to horizontality. This 
is particularly so given courts’ proven ability to deal competently both with vertical 
ESR cases and a range of  different, complex private law actions between individuals.
Furthermore, in a system of  constitutional supremacy such as those in South Africa 
and Ireland under which courts are mandated to uphold the provisions of  a Constitution, 
it is unacceptable for them to refuse to meet their obligation to give effect to constitutional 
rights and principles—including the horizontal application of  ESR where relevant—on 
the grounds of  alleged (as opposed to clearly established) incapacity. The fact that other 
bodies are better placed to make policy decisions, does not mean that a court can avoid 
deciding “policy questions” (such as those that allegedly arise in cases involving ESR and/
or horizontal effect) where such questions coincide with questions of  constitutional law.
3. Horizontal application of  ESR—two national experiences
Before beginning a consideration of  specific domestic experiences, it is important 
to differentiate between different models of  constitutional protection against rights 
violations caused by private actors.17 Under the traditional constitutional model—
the “vertical” model—constitutional rights apply exclusively against the state and 
its actors—the classic example being the US Constitution. Under a horizontal model 
such as those in Malawi, Argentina, and Ghana, constitutional rights are (at least 
potentially) directly enforceable against private actors in some circumstances.18 In 
between, there are variants, or “diagonal models,” under which constitutional rights 
have “indirect horizontal effect.” This means that whilst constitutional rights cannot 
be applied directly to the law governing private relations and are not actionable per se, 
they may be relied on directly or indirectly to influence the interpretation and applica-
tion of  preexisting law.19 “Indirect horizontal effect” can be either “weak” or “strong” 
15 For a discussion of  the alleged judicial incapacity in dealing with ESR claims, see Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter 
& Malcolm. Langford, The Justiciability of  Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal, CHRGJ Working 
Paper No. 15 (2007), available at http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/wp/NolanPorterLangford.pdf, 
last accessed 12 January 2014.
16 There is a vast literature on this point. For examples of  key discussions of  such, see SociaL rigHtS JuriSpru-
deNce, supra note 12; SociaL aNd ecoNomic rigHtS iN tHeorY aNd practice: a criticaL aSSeSSmeNt (Helena Alviar 
García, Karl Klare and Lucy Williams eds., 2014).
17 For an excellent discussion of  the different definitions employed by commentators in relation to models of  
constitutional protection of  rights, with a specific focus on horizontality, see Stephen Gardbaum, Where 
the (State) Action Is, 4(4) iNt’L J. coNSt. L. 760 (2006).
18 See gHaNaiaN coNStitutioN, 1992, art. 12(1); coNStitutioN of maLawi, 1995, § 15(1); gamBiaN coNStitutioN, 
1997, art. 17(1); coNStitutioN of cape verde, 1990, art. 18; coNStitutioN of SwaziLaNd, 2005, § 14(2); and 
argeNtiNeaN coNStitutioN, 1994, art. 43.
19 Gavin Phillipson, The Human Rights Act, “A Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper, 
62(6) mod. L. rev. 824, 826 (1999).
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in nature. Under the strong version of  indirect effect, judges may apply conditional 
protection in a suit between private parties where one party relies on law which is 
unconstitutional.20 The weak version of  “indirect horizontal effect” only permits 
judges to read in constitutional values when deciding cases between private parties. 
The Canadian Supreme Court21 and the German Federal Constitutional Court22 have 
adopted variations of  this approach. As discussed below, constitutional frameworks 
may contain vertical and horizontal elements. In addition, they may permit both 
direct and indirect horizontal effect. In this article, however, I will focus primarily on 
direct horizontal effect.
3.1 ESR and the Irish Constitutional Framework
The Irish Constitution contains a number of  ESR-related provisions of  both a justi-
ciable and non-justiciable nature. 23 Most notably, Article 42 makes provision for the 
right to primary education24 and states that “in exceptional cases, where the parents 
for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State as 
guardian of  the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the 
place of  the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of  the child.” This duty necessarily has a corresponding right, which can be 
used as the basis of  a claim against the State.
Many of  the ESR accorded under the Irish Constitution are “unenumerated” 
personal rights, which are primarily guaranteed under Article 40.3.1º of  the 
Constitution. That provision states that: “[t]he State guarantees in its laws to respect, 
and, as far as practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of  the 
citizen” (emphasis added). It is clear that this provision imposes a duty on the State to 
take positive action in appropriate circumstances.25 Article 40.3.2º provides further 
that the State shall, “in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of  injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property 
rights of  every citizen.” As we will see below, in some circumstances, the courts have 
not limited the obligation of  the State (which they have interpreted broadly in order to 
include the courts) to “defend and vindicate the personal rights of  citizens” solely to 
attacks by organs of  the State. In Ryan v. The Attorney General, Justice Kenny in the High 
Court held that the “personal rights” mentioned in Article 40.3.1º are not exhausted 
20 aNdrew cLapHam, HumaN rigHtS oBLigatioNS of NoN-State actorS 437 (2006).
21 See, e.g., the decision of  the Canadian Supreme Court in Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. Dolphin 
Delivery Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
22 For an explanation of  the difference between the Canadian and German models of  indirect horizontal 
effect, see Gardbaum, supra note 5, 402–407.
23 For an extensive discussion of  ESR jurisprudence under the Irish Constitution, see pauL o’coNNeLL, viNdicatiNg 
Socio-ecoNomic rigHtS: iNterNatioNaL StaNdardS aNd comparative experieNceS (2012); iriSH HumaN rigHtS 
commiSSioN, makiNg ecoNomic, SociaL aNd cuLturaL rigHtS effective: aN iHrc diScuSSioN documeNt (2005).
24 Article 42(2) provides: “The State shall provide for free primary education and shall endeavour to supple-
ment and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and, when the public good 
requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of  
parents, especially in the matter of  religious and moral formation.”
25 gerrY wHYte, SociaL iNcLuSioN aNd tHe LegaL SYStem—puBLic iNtereSt Law iN ireLaNd 19 (2002).
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by the rights to “life, person, good name and property rights” expressly enumerated 
in Article 40.3.2º,26 a position confirmed by the Supreme Court in the same case.27 
Court-identified, unenumerated (i.e. unwritten) ESR under Article 40.3.1º include 
various rights of  the child,28 the right to bodily integrity,29 including the right not to 
have health endangered by the state,30 and the right to work or to earn a livelihood.31 
The Irish Courts have therefore been prepared to recognize that the Constitution pro-
tects unenumerated ESR, although only the first two of  these rights have been held to 
give rise to a positive obligation on the state.
In terms of  other constitutional protections, civil and political rights such as the 
right to life (Article 40.3.2º)32 also have the potential to serve as sources of  ESR or to 
be applied in such a way as to protect those rights.33 Furthermore, Article 45 of  the 
Irish Constitution sets out a number of  expressly non-justiciable directive principles of  
social policy, which are intended for the general guidance of  the Oireachtas.34 Some 
of  these principles have clear implications for the enjoyment of  ESR.35 Article 45 has 
been used by the Irish courts as an interpretive instrument with regard to, amongst 
other things, the identification of  unenumerated personal rights under Article 40.3 of  
the Constitution. 36 It has not, however, been employed innovatively by courts to give 
effect to ESR in the way that has occurred with regard to constitutional directive prin-
ciples in jurisdictions such as India or Bangladesh.37 I will not address these directive 
principles in any significant detail due to their non-justiciable nature.
In recent years, concerns about the implications of  adjudication of  ESR for the 
separation of  powers and the involvement of  the courts in what are deemed issues of  
“distributive justice” have resulted in a general reluctance on the part of  Irish courts 
to recognize and give proper effect to such rights. Not only has the Supreme Court gen-
erally refused to recognize the existence of  additional unenumerated ESR, but it has 
gone so far as to question the existence of  ESR previously identified by other courts.38 
26 Ryan v. Attorney General, [1965] IR 294, 312–313 (Ir.).
27 Id. at 344.
28 See, e.g., FN v. Minister for Education [1995] 1 IR 409 (Ir.).
29 See Ryan [1965] IR at 313.
30 See, e.g., The State (C) v. Frawley [1976] IR 365 (Ir.).
31 See Murtagh Properties v. Cleary [1972] IR 330 (Ir.) discussed infra; Murphy v. Stewart [1973] IR 97 (Ir.); 
and Minister for Posts and Telegraphs v. Paperlink [1984] ILRM 373 (Ir.).
32 See, e.g., G v. An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32, 69 per Walsh J (Ir.).
33 See, e.g., coNStitutioN review group, report of tHe coNStitutioN review group 236 (1996).
34 The Houses of  the Oireachtas—Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann—are the Irish houses of  parliament.
35 See, e.g., art. 45(4)(i).
36 One example is the case of  Murtagh Properties [1972] IR 330 discussed infra. For more on the con-
tent and judicial treatment of  art. 45, see J.m. keLLY: tHe iriSH coNStitutioN 2077–2086 (Gerry Whyte & 
Gerard Hogan eds, 4th ed., 2003); and Gerard Hogan, Directive Principles, Socio-Economic Rights and the 
Constitution, 36 iriSH JuriSt 174, 179–181 (2001).
37 For more, see S. Muraldhir, India, in SociaL rigHtS JuriSprudeNce, supra note 12, 102; and Iain Byrne & Sara 
Hossain, South Asia, in SociaL rigHtS JuriSprudeNce, supra note 12, 125.
38 See, e.g., TD v. Minister for Education [2001] 4 IR 259 (Ir.). For an example of  a positive (albeit limited) 
departure from the strident, “anti-unenumerated ESR” views expressed by the Supreme Court in TD 
[2001] 4 IR 259, see the Supreme Court decision in In re Article 26 and the Health (Amendment) (No. 
2) Bill [2005] IESC 7.
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Furthermore, even where the Supreme Court has been prepared to hold that the State 
is in violation of  its constitutional ESR-duties, it has refused to grant mandatory 
orders directing the State to take steps to comply with its obligations,39 thereby further 
weakening the effect of  ESR under the Irish Constitution. Indeed, there is evidence 
that the Courts are adopting an ever-more restrictive approach towards the definition 
of  positive obligations imposed by constitutional ESR—a fact that is particularly evi-
dent in the context of  the judicial identification of  the level of  service provision which 
the State is constitutionally obliged to provide under Article 42.4 in the context of  
education.40
3.2 Ireland, ESR, and horizontality: from a bang to a whimper?
While the wording of  Articles 40.3.1º, 42.4, and 42.5 refers expressly to the duties 
of  the State to give effect to constitutional rights, the Irish Supreme Court has made it 
clear that constitutional rights (including ESR) may have direct horizontal effect and 
are not binding on the State alone.41 They have done so through the development of  
the constitutional tort, which arises where an individual’s right is interfered with by 
a third party. The remedies granted by the courts for such an action include damages 
and injunctive relief.42
The most significant early case dealing with the issue of  horizontal application is 
that of  Meskell v. CIE.43 Here the plaintiff ’s contract of  employment was terminated 
by the defendant employers. Unlike his fellow employees, he was not reemployed due 
to his refusal to accept a special condition of  (re)employment that he be a member of  a 
trade union on the grounds that it infringed his individual freedom of  choice. This case 
was argued on the basis of  the right to abstain from joining associations or unions 
rather than the right to livelihood. It is thus arguably more appropriately considered 
to be a civil and political rights case than an ESR one.
The Supreme Court held that the right of  citizens to form associations and unions, 
guaranteed by Article 40.6.1 of  the Constitution, necessarily recognized a correla-
tive right to disassociation. In this case, the plaintiff  was entitled to damages because, 
amongst other things, he had suffered loss caused by the NSA defendant employ-
ers’ conduct in violating a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The Court 
stated, per Justice Walsh, that “a right guaranteed by the Constitution or granted by 
39 See, e.g., the decision in TD [2001] 4 IR 259.
40 See, e.g., the significant contrast between the different tests applied by the courts in determining the 
extent of  the state’s constitutional obligation in relation to the right to education of  children with special 
needs in the 1996 decision of  O’Donoghue v. Minister for Health [1996] 2 IR 20 (Ir.) and, nine years later, 
in O’Carolan v. Minister for Education [2005] IEHC 296 (Ir.).
41 For more on the horizontal application of  constitutional rights under the Irish Constitution generally, 
see Andrew Butler, Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation: A  Critique and Comparative Analysis, 22 
aNgLo-am. L. rev. 1 (1993).
42 For a detailed discussion of  how the “constitutional tort” has operated, see Colm O’Cinneide, Grasping The 
Nettle: Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect, in HumaN rigHtS iN tHe private SpHere 213 (Jorg 
Fedtke & Dawn Oliver eds, 2007).
43 Meskell v. CIE [1973] IR 121 (Ir.)).
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the Constitution can be protected by action or enforced by action even though such 
action may not fit into any of  the ordinary forms of  action in either common law or 
equity and that the constitutional right carries within it its own right to a remedy or 
for the enforcement of  it.” It followed that “if  a person has suffered damage by virtue 
of  a breach of  a constitutional right or the infringement of  a constitutional right, that 
person is entitled to seek redress against the person or persons who have infringed 
that right.”44 The Court expressly referred to and agreed with the statement of  Justice 
Budd in another trade union case, Educational Company of  Ireland Ltd. v. Fitzpatrick (No. 
2),45 that “if  one citizen has a right under the Constitution there exists a correlative 
duty on the part of  other citizens to respect that right and not to interfere with it. . . . 
It follows that the Courts will not so act as to permit any body of  citizens to deprive 
another of  his constitutional rights and will in any proceedings before them see that 
these rights are protected, whether they be assailed under the guise of  a statutory 
right or otherwise.”46
O’Cinneide has observed that the defendants in Meskell were a semi-state nation-
alized corporation—and hence not an entirely private entity.47 In subsequent cases, 
however, Irish courts have held that constitutional rights can apply horizontally to 
purely private bodies, including in cases involving ESR such as the right to liveli-
hood. 48 Butler has argued that it was a desire to protect the employee’s exercise of  his 
autonomy expressed through the exercise of  his choice not to participate in a trade 
union that motivated the approach adopted by the Irish Supreme Court in Educational 
Company of  Ireland and several other cases involving trade unions.49 This is significant 
in light of  the fact that one of  the most-cited objections to the horizontal application 
of  ESR from a liberal constitutional theory perspective is the alleged threat posed to 
the values of  liberty, autonomy and privacy by the intrusion of  constitutional rights 
into the private sphere. 50 It is argued that a rigid distinction exists between the private 
44 Id. at 133. For a similar judicial statement (in the very different context of  the constitutional right to life 
of  the unborn) see in Attorney General (Society for the Protection of  the Unborn Child (Ireland) Ltd.) 
v. Open-Door Counselling Ltd. [1988] IR 593 per Hamilton P.
45 Educational Company of  Ireland Ltd. v. Fitzpatrick (No. 2) [1961] IR 345, 368 (Ir.) (emphasis added).
46 Meskell [1973] IR at 133. See also id. at 305. See also Justice Costello’s statement in Hosford v. Murphy & 
Sons Ltd. [1988] ILRM 300, 304 (Ir.) that, “[u]niquely, the Irish Constitution confers a right of  action for 
breach of  constitutionally protected rights against persons other than the State and its officials.”
47 O’Cinneide, supra note 42, at 220.
48 See Murtagh Properties [1972] IR 330 which involved the right to livelihood/work. See also Lovett 
v. Grogan [1995] 3 IR 132 (Ir.), a right to livelihood case in which the defendant was a private, unlicensed 
bus company.
49 Butler, supra note 41, at 26–32. Interestingly, concerns about Nationalist Party-appointed judges 
empowered by a horizontally applicable Bill of  Rights to interfere with labor law protections, led to some 
in the ANC to oppose horizontality as a general application being included in the South African Interim 
Constitution of  1993: see mattHew cHaSkaLSoN & ricHard Spitz, tHe poLiticS of traNSitioN: a HiddeN HiStorY 
of SoutH africa’S Negotiated SettLemeNt 270–271 (2000).
50 It is worth noting that the definitions of  “liberty,” “autonomy,” and “privacy” defended by commentators 
arguing against horizontal application tend to be narrow and formal. For a critique of  the liberal notion of  
autonomy and a proposal of  a more substantive form of  autonomy in the context of  constitutional rights 
application, see Stuart Woolman & Dennis Davis, The Last Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism and 
the Application of  Fundamental Rights Under the Interim and Final Constitutions, 12 S. afr. J. Hum. rtS 36 (1996).
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and the public spheres and that the purpose of  fundamental rights protection is to pre-
serve the integrity of  the private sphere against coercive intrusion by the state.51 Such 
an argument fails to acknowledge that those exercising private power are actually 
exercising power conferred on them by laws creating and regulating market behavior. 
This results in the implication of  the state in all private decisions and demonstrates 
the “illusory” nature of  the proffered public/private distinction.52 The notion of  rights 
as imposing predominantly negative obligations and operating as a “buffer against 
the state”—a key feature of  liberal theory—is inconsistent with the transformative 
and redistributory vision underlying ESR, which frequently entail positive action on 
the part of  the State. Furthermore, if  one regards rights simply as concerned with 
protecting right-holders against government interference, one will almost inevitably 
object to the horizontal application of  any right to private actors. Such a narrow view 
of  rights, and of  the conceptions of  liberty and autonomy that allegedly underpin or 
justify rights, is reflective of  a limited liberal conception of  rights and contrasts with 
other, more expansive notions of  human rights based on dignity and equality, such as 
those found under international human rights law, for example.
It follows that a refusal to extend the applicability of  a constitution to private rela-
tionships due to concerns about the impact that this may have on the individual lib-
erty and autonomy of  those private actors upon whom the obligations are imposed 
may result in the impact that private action may have on the liberty, autonomy, and 
rights of  others being ignored. Apart from the trade-union employee example, another 
instance would be where a parent refuses to allow a school doctor to perform a health 
check on her child on the grounds of  family privacy or parental autonomy. This refusal 
may have direct implications for the child’s future capacity for autonomy.53
It is clear from the statements made by the courts in Meskell and Educational Company 
of  Ireland, as well as in other Irish horizontality decisions detailed in this article, that 
the Irish courts have not appeared to consider or engage with any of  the key objec-
tions from liberal constitutional theory to the horizontal application of  constitutional 
rights—including ESR—to private actors in their reasoning.54 This is in striking con-
trast to the extensive debate that surrounded the provision for horizontality under 
51 Murray Hunt, The “Horizontal Effect” of  the Human Rights Act, puBLic Law 423, 424 (1998).
52 Mark Tushnet, The Issue of  State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law, 1(1) iNt’L 
J. coNSt. L. 79 (2003).
53 A key issue to note with regard to the horizontal application of  the positive obligations imposed by ESR 
in the context of  privatization in particular, is that the arguments made against imposing such duties on 
private individuals on the basis of  the alleged implications of  such obligations for individuals’ autonomy 
and liberty are only tangentially relevant. See SaNdra fredmaN, HumaN rigHtS traNSformed: poSitive rigHtS 
aNd poSitive dutieS 58 (2008). Fredman observes that the subjects of  such duties in this context are not 
private individuals but corporate bodies or unincorporated associations (legal persons). Hence it is not 
obvious that they have freedoms or rights in the same sense as private individuals (id.). Nor is it convinc-
ing to argue that there is the same moral onus to ensure the autonomy and liberty of  these actors as there 
is in relation to natural persons.
54 That is not to suggest that the decisions of  the Irish courts in this context cannot be analyzed using a 
“personal autonomy” lens. See, e.g., the discussion in Butler, supra note 41. Rather, it is just that the courts 
have not explicitly employed such reasoning to any significant degree in their horizontality decisions.
 at U
niversity of N
ottingham
 on A
ugust 12, 2016
http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
72 I•CON 12 (2014), 61–93
the final version of  the South African Constitution.55 It has been suggested that the 
emergence of  the Irish model of  constitutional rights in which the private and public 
spheres are fused (or at least, undifferentiated) is attributable to two factors. First, the 
fact that the Irish Constitution is based on natural law philosophy, according to which 
rights inhere in people by virtue of  their humanity rather than being accorded by 
a positive legal system.56 From a natural law perspective, constitutional rights pre-
cede and underpin the constitution and must be protected against threats from all 
sources, not just those posed by the state which is given form by the positive legal sys-
tem. A  natural law justification for horizontality has, however, not been explicit in 
any of  the relevant Irish jurisprudence. Second, the Meskell doctrine came into being 
at a time when the Irish judiciary was extremely willing in judicial review cases to 
employ constitutional rights as limitations upon the power of  the elected branches of  
government (particularly the executive). The courts’ approach in Meskell and other 
early horizontal-effect cases is consistent with this judicial concern with the primacy 
and protection of  constitutional fundamental rights, regardless of  the state/non-state 
nature of  the violator.
The wording employed by Justice Budd in Fitzpatrick would suggest that the hori-
zontal application of  constitutional rights under the Irish Constitution gives rise to 
a negative obligation of  non-interference. Indeed, the Irish courts have yet to apply 
ESR under the Constitution to impose a positive obligation on a NSA. In addition, the 
right to equality before the law, which has proved a vital tool in terms of  addressing 
ESR violations by NSA in some jurisdictions, has thus far not been held to be capable 
of  horizontal application by the Irish Courts,57 a situation that is arguably reflective of  
the wording of  Article 40.1, which refers to the “state” and “equality before the law.” 
This is in direct contrast to the approach to equality under § 9(4) the South African 
Constitution, which provides that “no person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone” and requires that national legislation be enacted to prevent 
or prohibit such unfair discrimination.
In Ireland, the issue of  the direct horizontal application of  constitutional ESR has 
also arisen in the context of  the right to education. In Crowley v. Ireland58 teachers in 
a particular area withdrew their services because of  a dispute between themselves 
and their trade union on the one hand and the manager of  the schools in that area on 
the other. Subsequently, the teachers’ trade union instructed the teachers in schools 
in neighboring areas not to enroll the students from the aforementioned area in 
their schools. The trade union later withdrew that instruction. Some time later, the 
Department of  Education arranged for buses to bring children affected by the teach-
ers’ strike in the original area to schools in the neighboring areas and to bring them 
home at the end of  the day. A number of  children brought an action against, amongst 
55 See infra note 84.
56 BrYaN mcmaHoN & wiLLiam BiNcHY, iriSH Law of tortS ¶ 1.77 (3d. ed. 2000).
57 Art. 40.1. For more on this, see Siobhán Mullally, Substantive Equality and Positive Duties in Ireland, 23 S. 
africaN J. Hum. rtS 291 (2007).
58 Crowley v. Ireland [1980] IR 102 (Ir.).
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others, the Department of  Education and the trade union. The High Court held that 
the trade union’s circular was an unlawful interference with the constitutional right 
of  the plaintiffs to free primary education under Article 42.4, which was actionable at 
the suit of  the children.59
The Irish Constitution contains one provision which expressly furnishes one 
group—children—with an ESR operable against persons other than the state. Article 
42.1 provides that parents are obliged “to provide, according to their means, for the 
religious and moral, intellectual physical and social education of  their children.” 
The constitutional duty imposed on parents by that article accords a corresponding 
right to children to seek the provision for such education from their parents where 
their parents fail to provide such.60 Thus far, this provision has not been the subject of  
considerable judicial discussion in an ESR context.61 Applying Article 42.5 to Article 
42.1, it would appear that where parents fail in their duty to provide for the religious 
and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of  their children, the State 
“by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of  the parents.” It would 
therefore seem that Article 42.1 may also serve as the basis for ESR claims of  children 
against the State—albeit that the proof  required to show that the state failed to inter-
vene is extremely high. The extent and nature of  such a claim presumably depend on 
the interpretation adopted of  what is required of  the state where it “endeavour[s] to 
supply the place of  parents” (emphasis added). Thus an ESR duty, which is envisaged 
as having primarily horizontal application under the Constitution, may, in some situ-
ations, also have vertical application.
To date there is very limited Irish ESR-specific case law dealing with the issue of  the 
application of  constitutional rights to private parties and to horizontal, as opposed to 
merely vertical, relationships. Nor does it seem likely that any such case law is likely 
to come into existence in the near future due to the recent animosity of  the Supreme 
Court to justiciable ESR62 and the growing reluctance of  Irish courts to apply consti-
tutional rights to private relationships. Indeed, it is notable that while the courts in 
the early Irish horizontal application cases did not address or dwell upon the alleged 
challenges posed to the horizontal application of  ESR by arguments based on formal, 
59 See also Hayes v. Ireland [1987] ILRM 65 (Ir.); Conway v. Irish National Teachers’ Organisation and Ors. 
[1991] ILRM 497 (Ir.).
60 For more on this, see A.G. v. Dowse & Anor. [2006] IEHC 64 per MacMenamin J (Ir.).
61 For an interesting case involving the obligations owed by a non-state actor who was not a parent in terms 
of  art. 42.1, see Hosford [1988] ILRM 300.
62 See, e.g., the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] 2 IR 545 (Ir.) and TD 
[2001] 4 IR 259. For analysis, see Nolan, surpra note 11. For a slightly more positive view, see William 
Binchy, Promoting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Ireland, paper presented at Irish Human Rights 
Commission and the Law Society of  Ireland, Annual Human Rights Conference: Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Making States Accountable, Nov. 21, 2009, who argues that “there is some evidence 
that the robust philosophical antipathy to justiciability is losing its pre-eminence. Other voices are begin-
ning to be heard at both High Court and Supreme Court levels which suggest an openness to protecting 
these rights” (at 3). As Binchy notes, however, this has largely been the result of  judicial interpretation 
and application of  ESR-related provisions of  the European Convention of  Human Rights Act 2003—not 
constitutional ESR.
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narrow conceptions of  democratic decision-making and the separation of  powers 
such as those historically found under liberal constitutional theory, the deployment 
of  such conceptions has formed a key part of  the Supreme Court’s justifications of  its 
more recent reluctance to enforce constitutional ESR.63
Unfortunately, the horizontal application of  ESR in the Irish constitutional frame-
work suffers from the general problems surrounding the constitutional tort. McMahon 
and Binchy, O’Cinneide, and others, have highlighted the serious lack of  conceptual 
clarity that exists in relation to when, how, and to what extent horizontal effect should 
be given to constitutional rights by the Irish courts.64 In a number of  cases from the 
late 1980s onwards, the Irish courts have attempted to limit the principle set out in 
Meskell by holding that a constitutional tort action will not lie where constitutional 
rights are regulated and protected by existing common law or legislation.65 Thus, 
although the courts have not repudiated the Meskell principle, they have sought to 
mitigate its practical effects by looking to pre-existing law (whether common law or 
statutory) as the medium through which the constitutional remedy should be chan-
neled in most cases.66
3.3 ESR and the South African constitutional framework
Unlike the Irish constitutional framework, a wide range of  ESR are expressly included 
in the South African Constitution.67 The rights of  “everyone” to have access to ade-
quate housing,68 health care services, sufficient food and water, social security,69 and 
further education70 are expressly qualified by available resources and a duty of  pro-
gressive (rather than immediate) realization. In contrast, the right of  everyone to a 
basic education,71 the rights of  children to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care 
services, and social services,72 and the right of  prisoners to conditions of  detention 
that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, 
at state expense, of  adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material, and medi-
cal treatment73 are not. This latter group of  rights prima facie imposes a direct and 
immediate obligation upon the state to meet the ESR needs of  those groups. This is not, 
63 See, e.g., Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] IESC 63, ¶ 374 per Hardiman J. See also TD [2001] 4 IR 
259.
64 McMahon & Binchy, supra note 56, ¶¶ 1.07–1.83; O’Cinneide, supra note 42, at 213.
65 See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Merck Sharp & Dohme (Ireland) Ltd. [1988] ILRM 629 (Ir.). For an analysis and 
critique of  this and other recent decisions on the constitutional tort, see McMahon & Binchy, supra note 
56, ¶¶ 1.18–1.84.
66 McMahon & Binchy, supra note 56, ¶ 1.60.
67 For an excellent overview of  South African ESR literature and jurisprudence Constitution, see Sandra 
Liebenberg, The Interpretation of  Socio-Economic Rights, in coNStitutioNaL Law of SoutH africa ch. 33 
(Stuart Woolman et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2007).
68 S. afr. coNSt., § 26.
69 Id. § 27.
70 Id. § 29(1)(b).
71 Id. § 29(1)(a).
72 Id. § 28(1)(c).
73 Id. § 35(2)(e).
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however, the way in which the provisions furnishing the ESR of  children74 and pris-
oners75 have been interpreted, although the same is not true with regard to the right 
to basic education.76 As well as delineating specific ESR, the Constitution also states 
that no one may be arbitrarily evicted from their home or refused emergency medical 
treatment.77 In addition to the internal limitation clauses included in the wording of  
specific rights provisions, all ESR may be limited in terms of  the umbrella limitation 
clause in § 36.78
 Unlike the Irish courts, with the exception of  the early Soobramoney case,79 the 
South African courts have, until recently, generally not flinched when dealing with 
ESR. In adjudicating the positive obligations imposed on the state by ESR under 
§§ 26 and 27 of  the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has adopted a “reasonable-
ness” test in order to evaluate the constitutionality of  state action (or inaction).80 So 
far, the Court has refused to recognize that the ESR of  “everyone” can give rise to a 
minimum core obligation on the part of  the state to provide a basic level of  services 
to every individual in need, although it has stated that there may be future cases in 
which it is possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of  a minimum core 
obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the State are reasonable.81 As 
we will see below, the Constitutional Court has recognized on several occasions that 
constitutional ESR impose a negative obligation upon the State and all other entities 
and persons to desist from interfering with ESR.
74 For more on this, see the Constitutional Court’s decision in Government of  the RSA & Ors. v. Grootboom 
& Ors. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.), which is discussed infra. The Court has not yet found that 
§ 28(1)(c) imposes a direct, immediate obligation on the state in any case that appears before it, prefer-
ring consistently to consider the state’s duty to children through the lens of  the duties owed by the State 
to “everyone” under §§ 26(2) and 27(2).
75 In B v. Minister for Correctional Service 1997 (6) BLCR 789 (C) (S. Afr.).
76 See Governing Body of  the Juma Musjid Primary School & Ors. v. Essay NO and Ors. [2011] ZACC 13 (CCT 
29/10) (Apr. 11 2011) (S. Afr.) in which the Constitutional Court stated, “unlike some of  the other socio-
economic rights, this right [to basic education] is immediately realizable” (id. ¶ 37).
77 S. afr. coNSt., §§ 26(3) and 27(3) respectively.
78 Id. § 36(1) states that “[t]he rights in the Bill of  Rights may be limited only in terms of  law of  general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic soci-
ety based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
(a) the nature of  the right; (b) the importance of  the purpose of  the limitation; (c) the nature and extent 
of  the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose.”
79 Soobramoney v. Minister of  Health (Kawzulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.).
80 For the elements of  a “reasonable” government programme, see Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, 
¶¶ 34–43, and Minister of  Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No. 2) (CCT8/02) 
[2002] ZACC 15, ¶ 123.
81 See Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶ 33, and TAC, ¶ 35. It is not clear, however, whether the 
Constitutional Court will ever, in practice, be prepared to regard constitutional ESR as imposing 
minimum core obligations. In the case of  Mazibuko & Ors. v. City of  Johannesburg & Ors. [2009] 
ZACC 28 (CCT 39/09) (S. Afr.), the Constitutional Court refused to set a minimum level of  water to 
be provided to “everyone” in order to satisfy the right to have access to sufficient water under art. 
27(1).
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3.4 South Africa, ESR, and horizontality: largely a case of  theory 
rather than practice?
The approach adopted towards horizontal application in the Final Constitution of  
1996 (“the Constitution”/”the South African Constitution”) is very different from 
that under the Interim Constitution of  1993, which contained no express reference to 
horizontal application82 and which did not explicitly state that the Bill of  Rights was 
directly binding on the judiciary.83 All rights in the Bill of  Rights in the Constitution 
of  1996—including ESR—impose a mix of  obligations on the state. Section 7 of  the 
Constitution provides that the state is obliged to respect, protect, promote and fulfill 
the rights in the Bill of  Rights.84 However, in addition to the vertical application of  
the Bill of  Rights to relationships between the state and private actors, the text of  the 
Constitution also makes express provision for the horizontal application of  rights. This 
is arguably no surprise given that,
against the backdrop of  South Africa’s past, the demand for horizontality is immediately 
apparent. In the first place, it commits individuals to the rebuilding of  the ethical relations 
so radically shattered during apartheid, through the undertaking of  legal duties to improve 
their communities. In the second place, given the enormous task of  reconstruction faced by the 
new South Africa, given the limited resources of  the state, and given the grossly unequal and 
enormous wealth which resides in the private sector, horizontality breathes new hope into the 
possibility of  creating a more equal and just society in the medium term. Thirdly, by requiring 
individuals to uphold their moral duties towards one another and to cooperate in realizing a 
new vision for a shared future, horizontality reaffirms the human dignity of  those who bear 
such duties as much as it does those who benefit from their performance.85
While the Irish decisions did not expressly address or take into account the arguments 
frequently raised in relation to the application of  constitutional rights to horizon-
tal relationships, these were considered at length both by the drafters of  the South 
African Constitution and the Courts.86 Thus, while the Irish Courts embraced hori-
zontal application of  ESR in a rather unselfconscious way and have not felt the need 
to take the comparative experience of  other jurisdictions on board, this has very much 
not been the case in South Africa.87
82 For more on horizontal application of  Chapter 3 (Bill of  Rights) of  the 1993 Constitution, see Cheadle & 
Davis, supra note 3, at 45–54.
83 S. afr. (iNterim) coNSt., § 7(1) provided that “[Chapter 3] shall bind all legislative and executive organs 
of  state at all levels of  government.” The leading case in this area under the Interim Constitution was Du 
Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.).
84 S. afr. coNSt., § 7(2) provides that: “The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of  Rights.”
85 Nick Friedman, Human Rights and the South African Common Law: Revisiting Horizontality (Draft, May 
30, 2005), available at http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Nick_Friedman_-_Revisiting_
Horizontality_-_30_May_2012.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014. That is not to suggest that all 
constitutional drafters were in favor of  horizontal application—whether direct or indirect. For more, 
see mattHew cHaSkaLSoN & ricHard Spitz, tHe poLiticS of traNSitioN: a  HiddeN HiStorY of SoutH africa’S 
Negotiated SettLemeNt 270–279 (2000).
86 For more, see Stuart Woolman, Application, in coNStitutioNaL Law of SoutH africa, supra note 67, ch. 31.
87 This is not simply a result of  judicial attitudes to international and comparative law: while both Ireland 
and South Africa have dualist legal systems, § 39(1) of  the South African Constitution states that when 
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 The primary decision dealing with the issue of  horizontal application under the 
Interim Constitution was that of  Du Plessis v. De Klerk,88 a defamation case. Having 
considered the application of  constitutional rights in a range of  different jurisdictions, 
including the US, Canada, Germany, and Ireland, Acting Justice Kentridge speaking 
for the majority of  the Court concluded that comparative examination “shows at once 
that there is no universal answer to the problem of  vertical or horizontal application 
of  a Bill of  Rights.” After briefly referring to the Irish position, he noted that “[v]ery 
different models of  constitutional adjudication are to be found elsewhere,”89 appear-
ing to regard the Irish position as something of  an anomaly. Ultimately, a majority of  
the Constitutional Court concluded that rights under the Interim Constitution could 
not be directly invoked by one private litigant against another, embracing instead the 
notion of  “indirect horizontal effect” of  constitutional rights.90 The Court did, how-
ever, hold that the Bill of  Rights could apply indirectly to proceedings between private 
individuals as the principles of  common law would have to be applied and developed 
by courts “with due regard to the spirit, purport and objects” of  the Bill of  Rights in 
light of  § 35(3) of  the Interim Constitution.91 All of  the majority judgments clearly 
subscribed to classic liberal political theory.92
Davis has noted that perhaps the most surprising aspect of  the majority approach 
in Du Plessis was that the judgment was delivered at a time when the Constitutional 
Assembly had already agreed to a formulation which subjected private power to con-
stitutional scrutiny: “as this decision was widely known, the majority of  the Court had 
placed themselves at intellectual odds with the new Constitution.”93 Shortly after Du 
Plessis, the Constitutional Court explicitly recognized that § 8 could have direct hori-
zontal application and found this to be consistent with the Constitutional Principles, 
including the separation of  powers, with which the Final Constitution had to comply.94
 I focus here on how that provision has—and might—operate in relation to ESR spe-
cifically. 95 Section 8(1) of  the Final Constitution provides that the Bill of  Rights applies 
to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of  
interpreting the Bill of  Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must, inter alia, consider international law and 
may consider foreign law. In practice, judges in both the lower courts and the Constitutional Court have 
not hesitated to be guided by and to invoke international law to support their findings. See John Dugard, 
International Law and the South African Constitution, 8(1) Eur. J. iNt’L L. 1, 14 (1997). This contrasts with 
the restrictive approach adopted by the Irish courts to comparative and international law. For more, see 
iNterNatioNaL Law iN practice: aN iriSH perSpective (Gernod Biehler ed., 2005).
88 Du Plessis 1996 (3) SA 850.
89 Id. ¶ 36.
90 Id. ¶ 62. See also id. ¶ 49.
91 Id. ¶ 63.
92 For more on this and an extensive critique of  the approach adopted by the majority of  the Constitutional 
Court in Du Plessis, see Woolman & Davis, supra note 50, at 36. See also Du Plessis 1996 (3) SA 850 (diss. 
op. Kriegler J).
93 deNNiS daviS, democracY aNd deLiBeratioN 106 (1999).
94 Ex parte Chairperson of  the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of  the Constitution of  the Republic of  
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), ¶¶ 53–56 (S. Afr.).
95 For a general discussion of  the different interpretations of  Section 8 and an account of  how it has been 
interpreted by the South African courts, see Woolman, supra note 86, at ch. 31.
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state.96 Thus, Courts are obliged to ensure that their decisions are consistent with the 
Bill of  Rights. From one perspective, this statement taken alone requires the automatic 
imposition of  horizontal obligations on non-state actors by courts. However, in its first 
decision on § 8(2), Khumalo v. Holomisa,97 the Constitutional Court disagreed with the 
applicants’ argument that, because in terms of  § 8(1) the Bill of  Rights applies to all 
law and binds the judiciary, the substantive provisions of  the Bill of  Rights should be 
taken to apply to all “law”-governed disputes between private actors,98 (be such law 
judge-made or otherwise). The Court did so on the ground that if  the effect of  § 8(1) 
and (2) read together were to be that the common law in all circumstances would 
fall within the direct application of  the Constitution, § 8(3) would have no apparent 
purpose and be redundant. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the right to freedom of  
expression was of  direct horizontal application in this case, stating that “given the 
intensity of  the constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential invasion 
of  that right which could be occasioned by persons other than the State or organs of  
State, it is clear that the right to freedom of  expression is of  direct horizontal applica-
tion in this case as contemplated by section 8(2) of  the Constitution.”99 However, the 
Court concluded that the ambit of  this right was outweighed by the Constitution’s 
commitment to dignity which was advanced through the common law of  defamation 
that was being challenged in this instance.
Section 8(2) states explicitly that a provision of  the Bill of  Rights binds a natural 
or a juristic person “if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of  the right and the nature of  any duty imposed by the right.” The wording of  
§ 8(2) acknowledges the varying extent to which rights (and the duties imposed by 
those rights) may apply to private actors, effectively according a margin of  judicial 
discretion in terms of  the application of  particular obligations to different NSA. Such 
an approach is appropriate. In practice, given international trends in housing delivery, 
it is easier to contemplate circumstances in which the right to have access to adequate 
housing will be held to be applicable to NSA, than would be the case in relation to the 
96 Section 239 defines an organ of  state as “(a) any department of  state or administration in the national, 
provincial or local sphere of  government; or (b) any other functionary or institution, (i) exercising a 
power or performing a function in terms of  the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising 
a public power or performing a public function in terms of  any legislation.” (It does not, however, include 
a court or a judicial officer.) It is thus clear that the Bill of  Rights directly imposes obligations on semi-
private actors exercising a power or performing a constitutional or public power or function. Section 239 
potentially re-characterizes many semi-private actors as state organs. See Ellman, supra note 8, at 23. 
Whether or not a “functionary” or “institution” will be held to qualify as a state or non-state organ will 
depend on the nature of  the power or function exercised by that actor or body and, ultimately, how the 
Constitutional Court chooses to define a “public,” or “constitutional” “power” or “function” in its juris-
prudence. It seems unlikely that the Court would be prepared to hold that private institutions are organs 
of  state where they have no nexus or are not under the control of  the state. The focus of  this article is on 
fully private bodies, so I will not dwell on this point further.
97 Khumalo v. Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401; 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (S. Afr.).
98 Woolman, supra note 86, 31–7. Woolman provides an excellent critique of  this decision at 31–6 to 
31-12, 31–42 to 31–56.
99 Khumalo [2002] ZACC 12 ¶ 33.
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Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic and social rights violations 79
right to have access to social security or social assistance—a socio-economic good that 
has traditionally been provided by the state rather than the private sector.
Section 8(3) provides that, in order to provide an effective remedy for ESR violations 
by private parties in terms of  Article 8(2), a court “must apply, or if  necessary develop, 
the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.”100 This 
is sometimes called direct–indirect horizontal application or direct-mediated horizon-
tal application: “the Constitution directly applies and persons are directly bound by 
Section 8(2), but the remedy is not a separate constitutional remedy [as one sees in 
the Irish context] but one that integrates what is constitutionally required with the 
development of  the common law under Section 8(3).”101
Section 8(3) is linked to the requirement in § 39(2) that, when interpreting any 
legislation, (and most importantly) when developing the common law or customary 
law, “every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of  
the Bill of  Rights.”102 Liebenberg observes that one ESR provision of  the Bill of  Rights, 
§ 26(3) prohibiting arbitrary evictions, has already had an impact on the common 
law of  property103 and the common law of  eviction proceedings, with the Supreme 
Court of  Appeal stating on at least one occasion that the provision is capable of  hori-
zontal application.104 The South African experience in this context differs from that of  
Ireland where the courts have generally applied common law tort principles in isola-
tion from the constitutional perspective.105
In striking contrast to the Irish judicial dicta, Article 8(2) would prima facie appear 
able to give rise to a situation in which constitutional rights may impose positive obli-
gations on non-state actors, rather than simply a duty to respect or not interfere with 
these rights. Ellman claims that it is possible to interpret the constitutional inclusion 
of  horizontality and ESR to extend the reach of  the Constitution to a truly vast range 
of  activity by private citizens. He argues, however, that the language of  the relevant 
provisions, does not compel this reading. In his view “[o]ne reason to hesitate is that 
most of  the socioeconomic rights sections are qualified, even as applied to the state 
itself, by constitutional recognition of  the limited resources available to the state for 
100 Liebenberg, supra note 67, 33–57.
101 Christopher Roederer, The Transformation of  South African Private Law after Ten Years of  Democracy: The Role 
of  Torts (Delict) in the Consolidation of  Democracy, 37 coLum. Hum. rtS L. rev. 447, 503 (2006).
102 Section 39(2) clearly allows for indirect horizontal effect of  ESR. However, as the focus of  this article 
is direct horizontal effect, I  will not consider it any further here. For further discussion, see Sandra 
Liebenberg, The Application of  Socio-Economic Rights to Private Law, 3 tYdSkrif vir die Suid afrikaaNSe reg 
(TSAR) 464 (2008), available at http://justiciabilityconference.wikispaces.com/file/view/Liebenberg+-
+Application+of+socio-economic+rights+to+private+law.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014.
103 Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa, in SociaL rigHtS JuriSprudeNce, supra note 12, 75, at 79. For a discussion 
of  the development of  the common law in relation to § 8, see Liebenberg, supra note 67, 33–57 to 33–60; 
Andre van der Walt, Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term, 1 coNSt. ct. rev. 77 
(2008).
104 Brisley v. Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (S. Afr.). Unfortunately, at the time of  writing, this judgment was 
not available in English. Therefore, the above information has been taken from Liebenberg, supra note 67, 
33–60.
105 Binchy, supra note 62, at 13. Despite its name, the “constitutional tort” is a constitutional action, rather 
than one premised on tort law.
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realizing them.”106 He claims that, if  private actors are bound by these provisions at 
all, there surely must be some similar limit on their obligations. While this is probably 
correct, it is important to note, however, that not all ESR are internally qualified.
 Even those commentators on the South African Constitution who accept that some 
constitutional rights should be applicable to actors beyond the state objected to the 
extension of  horizontal application to ESR. In contrast to those such as Cheadle and 
Davis who took this view, 107 Chirwa has argued convincingly that the fact that socio-
economic rights generally serve as a vehicle for facilitating social equality and that the 
state is the key player in securing that goal should not be used to downplay the role 
that other actors play towards attaining this bigger vision.108 While the reference to 
the duty of  the “state” to take reasonable “legislative” measures in §§ 26(2) and 27(2) 
might suggest that these duties are meant to be solely operative against the state, the 
reference to “other measures” in those provisions would suggest that some of  the 
measures that are envisaged under those subsections are certainly capable of  being 
performed by NSA. Furthermore, as Chirwa notes, there is also no basis for precluding 
the application of  the rights guaranteed in those two subsections in the private sphere 
when other constitutional ESR seem to so apply.109
More broadly, efforts to argue that the horizontal application of  ESR would consti-
tute an even greater encroachment of  liberty/freedom (and particularly economic 
freedom) than the horizontal application of  civil and political rights due to the posi-
tive obligations and implications for resource allocation that ESR allegedly give rise 
to, are doomed to failure. The liberal theory-premised claim that “classical” civil and 
political rights are cost-free and give rise to exclusively negative duties has been com-
prehensively disproved.110 Furthermore, it is clear that ESR do not merely impose posi-
tive obligations: Where someone enjoys an ESR, the state is prohibited from acting in 
a way that would interfere with or impair the individual’s enjoyment of  that right.
That said, while neither category of  right exclusively imposes one kind of  duty, is 
always cost-free, or unfailingly requires the expenditure of  resources, ESR are, on 
average, somewhat more dependent for their full realization on positive state action 
than their civil and political counterparts.111 Efforts to vindicate such rights are often 
106 Ellman, supra note 8, at 23. See, e.g., § 27(2), which states that “[t]he state must take reasonable legisla-
tive and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of  [health 
care services, sufficient food and water, and social security, including social assistance].”
107 See Cheadle & Davis, supra note 3. See also iaiN currie & JoHaN de waaL, tHe BiLL of rigHtS HaNdBook 54–56 
(5th ed. 2006), although these commentators restrict themselves to saying that “the nature of  the positive 
duties imposed by [ESR] . . . would usually result in them not being applicable to private conduct” (id. at 55).
108 Danwood Chirwa, Obligations of  Non-state Actors in Relation to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under 
the South African Constitution, Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community Law Centre, University of  the 
Western Cape (2002).
109 Id.
110 For more on this, see, e.g., G. Van Hoof, The Legal Nature of  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal 
of  Some Traditional Views, in tHe rigHt to food 97 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski eds, 1984); and 
Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of  State Parties’ Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 Hum. rtS Q. 156 (1987).
111 Alston & Quinn, supra note 110, at 184.
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more likely to entail the expenditure of  resources than efforts to assure civil and politi-
cal rights. This is due to the more directly resource-dependent nature of  ESR, as well 
as the fact that the mechanisms necessary to ensure civil and political rights are more 
likely to already be in place. Thus, one might claim that ESR pose a particular chal-
lenge in relation to horizontality in light of  the fact that the horizontal application 
of  such rights is more likely to result in the imposition of  positive duties on non-state 
actors than would be the case where civil and political rights are at issue. Ultimately, 
however, bearing in mind that all human rights impose both positive and negative 
obligations and entail varying levels of  resources, the mere fact that ESR may give rise 
to positive obligations and may have resource implications cannot be taken to serve as 
an absolute bar on their horizontal application if  the same objection is not raised in 
relation to civil and political rights.
But what of  the practice? The South African ESR horizontality case study is primar-
ily significant because of  the degree to which ESR and the principle of  horizontality 
are enshrined in the Constitution, rather than on account of  the jurisprudence that 
has developed on the basis of  § 8. Thus far, there has only been one case, the Juma 
Musjid decision discussed below,112 in which the South African courts have addressed 
the horizontal application of  ESR under the Final Constitution in any detail and very 
few where the issue of  the direct application of  ESR to private actors has been consid-
ered at all.
Even before its first decision on § 8, the Constitutional Court had acknowledged that 
at least some of  the duties imposed by ESR are binding on private parties. Liebenberg 
stresses that, in its landmark housing rights decision of  Government of  the Republic 
of  South Africa v. Grootboom and others,113 the Constitutional Court held that § 26(1) 
imposes, at the very least, a negative obligation “upon the State and all other entities and 
persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of  access to adequate housing.” 114 
In the subsequent case of  Minister of  Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No. 2),115 
the Constitutional Court stated that that “negative obligation” applies equally to the 
§ 27(1) right of  access to health care services, including reproductive health care.116 
In the context of  § 26 specifically, the Constitutional Court stated in Grootboom that 
“[a] right of  access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the State who 
is responsible for the provision of  houses, but that other agents within our society, 
including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures 
to provide housing.”117 The Court thus acknowledged the role that private actors 
might play in relation to the provision of  housing.
112 Juma Musjid (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13.
113 Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).
114 Id. ¶ 34 (emphasis added). See also Jaftha v. Schoeman & Ors 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), ¶ 34 (S. Afr.); Machele 
& Ors v. Mailula & Ors 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC), ¶ 26 (S. Afr.).
115 Minister of  Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
116 Id. ¶ 46.
117 Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) ¶ 35. Chirwa argues that this statement confirms that private 
actors have positive obligations in relation to ESR. See Danwood Chirwa, Non-state Actors’ Responsibility 
for Socio-economic Rights: The Nature of  Their Obligations Under the South African Constitution, 3(3) 
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Prior to the Juma Musjid decision, the ruling in which the South African courts gave 
the most attention to the horizontal application of  ESR was President of  the Republic 
of  South Africa & Anor. v.  Modderklip Boerdery.118 This decision revolved around the 
state’s failure to enforce an eviction order granted by the High Court against illegal 
occupiers of  private land. It involved a conflict between the housing rights of  illegal 
occupiers and the property rights of  landowners. In the Supreme Court of  Appeal, 
Acting Justice Harms rejected the earlier conclusion of  the High Court that the right 
of  access to adequate housing is not one enforceable against an individual land-
owner in terms of  the Constitution.119 Justice Harms stated that, “circumstances can 
indeed be envisaged where the right would be enforceable horizontally but the present 
is not such a case.”120 The horizontal application of  § 26 was not dealt with by the 
Constitutional Court.121 Since then, the horizontality of  § 26 has only been the subject 
of  explicit judicial consideration on one occasion, when a private landowner brought 
eviction proceedings against occupiers. In this instance, the High Court held that the 
Constitution did not impose a duty on a private landowner “to provide housing or for 
that matter access to adequate housing let alone suitable alternative accommodation 
to homeless people or unlawful occupiers in the position of  the applicants.”122
When appealing the Supreme Court of  Appeal’s decision in Modderklip, the State 
argued that § 25(1) (the guarantee that no one may be deprived of  property except 
ESR rev. (2002), available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/projects/socio-economic-
rights/Research%20and%20Publications/ESR%20Review/Volume%203%20No%203%20-%20
November%202002.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2014. While this may well be true, it seems unlikely 
that this is the point that the court was making here. The full relevant quotation from the judgment 
reads: “[a] right of  access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the State who is respon-
sible for the provision of  houses, but that other agents within our society, last accessed 12 January 2014 
including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide housing.” 
This statement would seem to indicate that the state is not the only housing provider; it does not neces-
sarily imply that private individuals are obliged to provide such housing under the Bill of  Rights.
118 President of  the Republic of  South Africa & Anor. v. Modderklip Boerdery (CCT 20/04), 13 May 2005.
119 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. v. Modder East Squatters & Anor. 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) at 394J–395A–B 
(S. Afr.).
120 Id. ¶ 31.
121 One of  the reasons for this was the fact that the judgments of  the lower courts focused largely on the com-
peting constitutional rights of  private landowners to property and the housing rights of  unlawful occupi-
ers. In contrast, the Constitutional Court held that it was not necessary “to reach any conclusions . . . [on] 
whether Modderklip’s Section 25(1) right to property and the rights of  the unlawful occupiers under 
Sections 26(1) and (2) have been breached and if  so, to what extent” (¶ 26). Instead, it primarily based its 
ruling on Modderklip’s constitutional right “to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of  
law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or another independent, impartial tribunal of  forum” 
(§ 34) as read with the constitutional principle of  the rule of  law (§ 1(c)).
122 See Lingwood v. the Unlawful Occupiers of  R/E of  ERF 9 Highland, Case No. 2006/16243, S. Afr. High Ct. 
(Witwatersrand Local Div.), ¶ 19. Justice Mogagabe did acknowledge that the obligation “to provide housing 
or for that matter access to adequate housing” in § 26 of  the Constitution may, in certain appropriate circum-
stances, find horizontal application, “provided a proper case is made thereanent and provided ‘other agents 
within our society, including individuals themselves are enabled by legislative and other measures to provide 
housing’ (sic.)” (id. ¶ 19). However, in doing so, he may have misapplied the Grootboom dicta (which he cited 
in a footnote) as he seemed to suggest that the Section 26 duty at issue could only have horizontal effect where 
non-state actors (or ‘other agents’) have been ‘enabled by legislative and other measures to provide housing’.
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in terms of  law of  general application) does not apply to private conduct123 and that it 
has no horizontal application. In its judgment, that Court avoided engaging in a debate 
about horizontality by premising the breach of  the state’s duties to both the owner and 
the occupants on the constitutional duty to protect set out in § 7(2) of  the Constitution. 
In its subsequent judgment, the Constitutional Court expressly stated that it did not 
consider it necessary in this case to reach any conclusions on the question of  whether 
or not § 25(1) has horizontal application and if  so, under what circumstances.
Thus far, the Constitutional Court has been prepared to hold that an ESR imposes 
an obligation on a non-state actor in only one of  its decisions. In the Juma Musjid case, 
a private property owner, the Juma Musjid Trust, sought to evict a public school con-
ducted on its property. This was due to a commercial dispute between the Trust and 
the MEC for Education in Kwazulu-Natal. In its decision, the High Court found that the 
defendant trust was not exercising a public function and that it owed no constitutional 
obligation to the Governing Body of  the school or to the learners at the school; rather 
the obligation to respect the learners’ right to basic education was an obligation of  the 
Member of  the Executive Council (MEC) for Education. In doing so, the High Court 
emphasized the Trust’s own constitutional rights to property.
The Constitutional Court took a different approach. It ruled that there was no 
primary positive obligation on the Trust to provide basic education to the learners; 
rather, that primary positive obligation rested on the MEC. Nor was there an obliga-
tion on the Trust to make its property available to the MEC for use as a public school, 
although it had chosen to do so in accordance with legislation by forming an agree-
ment with the MEC.124 Crucially, however, the Court ruled that the private Trust did 
have a negative constitutional obligation to respect, and not impair, the learners’ right 
to a basic education under § 29 of  the Constitution.125 While, having regard to all the 
circumstances of  the case, including the aforementioned obligation, the Trustees had 
acted reasonably in approaching the High Court for an eviction order, that was not 
sufficient reason for the High Court to grant the order. In this instance, the High Court 
had failed to consider properly the best interests of  the learners and their right to a 
basic education when evaluating the eviction application.
So what does Juma Musjid tell us about how the Constitutional Court may treat § 8 
in future cases? First, it is notable that this case centered on a negative obligation on 
the part a non-state actor. The Court was not asked to address the potentially thorn-
ier issue of  positive obligations imposed by ESR. Indeed, in their amicus submission, 
the Children’s Law Centre and the Socio-economic Rights Initiative stated that “it is 
accepted that difficult questions will arise in the future regarding the extent to which 
positive duties flowing from this section may be binding on private parties.”126 They 
asserted that the position is different where, as in this case, the potential interference 
with existing enjoyment of  an ESR by the conduct of  non-state parties is involved. 
123 That is, conduct that is not authorized by law.
124 Juma Musjid [2011] ZACC 13 ¶ 57.
125 Id. ¶¶ 58, 60.
126 Amici Heads of  Arguments, ¶ 9.1.
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While the amici’s approach can be viewed as a strategic argument linked to the partic-
ular facts of  the case and directed at persuading the Court that § 8(2) could be applied 
at all, one might question whether it will come back to haunt future ESR advocates 
arguing in favor of  the enforcement of  positive ESR obligations.127 Leaving that point 
aside, there is nothing explicit in the Juma Musjid decision that suggests the Court 
would be as open to finding a positive ESR obligation to be directly applicable to NSA.
In terms of  the test to be applied with regard to § 8(2), the court followed the 
approach in Khumalo, stating that the application of  § 8(2) depends on the “intensity 
of  the constitutional right in question, coupled with the potential invasion of  that 
right which could be occasioned by persons other than the State or organs of  State.”128 
Juma Musjid involved the right to basic education which, the Court highlighted, plays 
an essential role in developing a child’s personality, talents, and mental and physi-
cal abilities to his or her fullest potential and in providing a foundation for lifetime 
learning and work opportunities.129 Notably, however, the judgment also highlighted 
the importance of  the right to basic education in terms of  its importance for “indi-
vidual and societal development in our democratic dispensation in the light of  the legacy 
of  apartheid” (emphasis added).130 Thus, it seems likely that, in future jurisprudence, 
the intensity of  a right for the purposes of  § 8(2) is to be evaluated both in terms of  
its importance to the individual ESR-holder as well as its function with regard to the 
particular post-apartheid socio-economic context in South Africa.
Unlike the Irish courts’ horizontality jurisprudence, the Court in Juma Musjid 
engaged with a number of  objections to the direct application of  ESR to NSA. First, 
the Court addressed the issue of  the potential intrusion of  direct horizontal applica-
tion on the autonomy of  the private constitutional duty-bearers head on, stating that 
“the purpose of  section 8(2) of  the Constitution is not to obstruct private autonomy 
or to impose on a private party the duties of  the state in protecting the Bill of  Rights. 
It is rather to require private parties not to interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of  
a right.”131 However, despite this lip-service to private actor autonomy, the Court was 
prepared to intrude on such here. The Court also highlighted the fact that, historically, 
because of  the clear distinction between the public law and private law, private entities 
had been held to be free to engage in their economic and social interests without state 
interference; “as a result, over emphasis (sic.) on the differences between the exercise 
of  private and public power often sheltered private power used for public purposes.”132 
The Court thus underlined how the alleged watertight distinction between public and 
private power would serve to disguise private power’s public dimension, thereby chal-
lenging the liberal constitutional theory presumption of  an impermeable divide.
 A final key issue that arose in the Juma Musjid case was the potentially conflict-
ing constitutional rights of  residents and property owners. The Constitutional Court 
127 The amici stated later: “The Khumalo approach makes clear that (at least) the negative duty not to impair 
existing access to a basic education is binding on private parties such as the Trust” (id. ¶ 9.2).
128 Juma Musjid [2011] ZACC 13 ¶ 58, citing Khumalo [2002] ZACC 12.
129 Id. ¶ 43.
130 Id. ¶ 42.
131 Id. ¶ 58.
132 Id. ¶ 55.
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cited its previous jurisprudence that the Constitution “imposes new obligations on the 
courts concerning rights relating to property. . . . It counterposes to the normal own-
ership rights of  possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right not 
arbitrarily to be deprived of  a home.”133 The Court here stated that “normal owner-
ship rights are not counterposed only to constitutional housing rights, but also, as this 
case shows, to other fundamental rights. What must be weighed against the right of  
ownership, in each case, will depend on the content of  each specific countervailing 
right.”134 As such, despite the Court’s statement that “the purpose of  section 8(2) of  
the Constitution is not to obstruct private autonomy or to impose on a private party 
the duties of  the state in protecting the Bill of  Rights,” Juma Musjid makes it clear that 
the protection of  autonomy manifested in property rights will not necessarily trump 
ESR obligations imposed by § 8(2) on non-state actors. This appears to be particularly 
likely to be so where a conflict arises between the implementation of  an ESR that is 
perceived by the court as addressing the consequences of  apartheid with a property 
right that is being employed in such a way as to imperil those efforts.
3.5. Moving beyond § 8
In addition to § 8, the Constitution imposes other direct ESR-related duties on non-
state actors.135 For instance, § 27(3), which states that that “no one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment” seems likely to be capable of  applying to private health 
service providers.136
As we have seen, the same is true of  § 26(3). In the context of  the right to educa-
tion, § 29(3) provides that, while everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at 
their own expense, independent educational institutions, such institutions must not 
discriminate on the basis of  race or maintain standards that are inferior to standards 
at comparable public educational institutions. The rights of  everyone to fair labor 
practices and to form and join a trade union set out in § 23 would also seem obvious 
contenders for horizontal application, as such rights have been in the Irish context. 
Similarly, the right of  persons to an environment that is not harmful to their health or 
well-being seems predisposed to being applicable against NSA.137
As with Ireland, the South African constitutional framework can be construed as 
imposing child ESR-related obligations on NSA. Section 28(1)(b) provides that chil-
dren have a right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care 
when removed from the family environment. Section 28(1)(c) states that every child 
133 Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC), ¶ 23 (S. Afr.).
134  Juma Musjid [2011] ZACC 13 ¶ 70.
135 There are also a number of  other constitutional provisions imposing explicit obligations on non-state 
actors that may have implications for the imposition of  obligations on non-state actors in an ESR context, 
e.g., § 9(4) of  the Constitution, discussed above. Also relevant is § 32(1)(b) which provides that everyone 
has the right of  access to any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exer-
cise or protection of  any rights. Neither provision has been the subject of  a decision in the context of  ESR.
136 IAIN CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 49 (6th edn, 2013).
137 § 24(a). Section 24(b), outlining the right of  everyone “to have the environment protected, for the benefit 
of  present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures” may also be of  hori-
zontal application as it is foreseeable that “other measures” may include those relating to non-state actors.
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has a right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services. 
In its jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court has held that § 28(1)(c) “encapsulates 
the conception of  the scope of  care that children should receive in South African soci-
ety”: § 28(1)(b) defines those responsible for giving care while § 28(1)(c) lists vari-
ous aspects of  the care entitlement.138 In Grootboom, the Court held that “[t]hrough 
legislation and the common law, the obligation to provide shelter in subsection (1)(c) 
is imposed primarily on the parents or family and only alternatively on the State.” 139 
Therefore, parents are obliged to give effect to the ESR of  their children to the best of  
their abilities. While a face-value reading of  § 28(1)(c) would seem to suggest that it 
is primarily vertical in effect, the Constitutional Court’s subordination of  that provi-
sion to § 28(1)(b), resulting in the imposition of  the primary duty to give effect to 
children’s ESR on parents, renders it primarily horizontal in effect.140 So far, however, 
there have been no instances of  children asserting violations of  § 28(1)(c) against 
their parents.141 Such cases are unlikely for a number of  reasons. First of  all, there are 
certain ESR set out in the subsection that parents seem unlikely to be in a position to 
deliver (for instance, social services). Second, the right to family/parental care under 
§ 28(1)(b) includes an economic aspect in terms of  providing for the child’s physical 
needs.142 Thus, children are more likely to rely on that provision when seeking ESR-
related goods from their parents. In the High Court case of  Jooste v. Botha, Justice Van 
Dijkhorst appeared to be of  the view that § 28(1)(b) was not intended to have direct 
horizontal effect. His opinion, however, seems to have been based on the fact that the 
predecessor of  § 28(1)(b) in the Interim Constitution was only vertical in effect, due to 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling in Du Plessis. This view is open to challenge in light 
of  the fact that § 8 of  the Final Constitution establishes a very different approach to 
the horizontal effect of  the Bill of  Rights of  the Final Constitution—an issue which the 
judge acknowledged but to which he failed to accord proper weight in his conclusions 
in relation to the horizontal effect of  § 28(1)(b).
In summary, in addition to the explicit reference to the potential horizontal applica-
tion of  the provisions of  the Bill of  Rights in § 8, the Constitutional Court has been 
prepared to identify and enforce obligations imposed on non-state actors. However, 
the dearth of  jurisprudence to date demonstrates that despite the strong concerns 
expressed by some commentators in relation to the inclusion, and implications, of  § 8, 
the South African Courts have been slow to get involved in the horizontal application 
of  the Bill of  Rights, including in an ESR context.
138 Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶76.
139 Id. ¶ 77.
140 The Court went on to state that “[t]his does not mean, however, that the State incurs no obligation in 
relation to children who are being cared for by their parents or families. In the first place, the State must 
provide the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded the 
protection contemplated by s 28 . . . In addition, the State is required to fulfil its obligations to provide 
families with access to land in terms of  Section 25, access to adequate housing in terms of  Section 26 as 
well as access to health care, food, water and social security in terms of  Section 27.” (id. ¶ 78).
141 For more on this issue, see Elsje Bonthuys, Realising South African Children’s Basic Socio-Economic Claims 
against Parents and the State: What Courts Can Achieve, 22 iNt’L J. L., poL’Y & famiLY 333 (2008).
142 Jooste v. Botha 2002 (2) BCLR 187 (T) at 189 (S. Afr.).
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4. Conclusion—evaluating effectiveness and domestic 
implications for the international dimension
By way of  concluding, I will now make some comments in relation to the effective-
ness of  the domestic legal models and approaches of  the judiciary in Ireland and 
South Africa in terms of  holding NSA directly liable for violations of  constitutional 
ESR. This will include suggesting how the efficacy of  each model can be developed and 
improved. Finally, I highlight the lessons that can and should be taken from these two 
domestic experiences by those seeking to advance the direct horizontal application of  
ESR at the international level.
This article has shown there to be four key limitations on the potential effectiveness 
of  the Irish “horizontality” model in relation to holding NSA to account for ESR viola-
tions. The first is the refusal of  the Irish courts to interpret constitutional ESR (or any 
constitutional rights) as imposing positive obligations on NSA. Bearing in mind the 
significance of  the positive obligations imposed by ESR, the failure of  the Irish courts 
to engage with this issue significantly limits their ability to ensure that NSA will be 
held to account for violations of  every kind of  duty imposed by ESR. Ultimately, if  the 
Irish courts will not address the positive obligations owed by NSA under the horizontal 
application of  ESR in an environment of  ever-increasing privatization and globaliza-
tion, this will result in uneven and ineffective protection of  ESR. The second obstacle 
to the effectiveness of  the Irish model is the Irish courts’ recent reluctance to ensure 
the enforcement of  constitutional ESR by any actor, whether state or non-state in 
nature. If  this judicial unwillingness continues, it seems extremely unlikely that the 
courts will be able (or indeed be willing) to hold NSA to account effectively. Another 
impediment to the effectiveness of  the Irish horizontality model is the lack of  clarity 
surrounding the constitutional tort action.143 The final effectiveness-related challenge 
is the ever more evident disinclination of  the Irish courts to apply constitutional rights 
horizontally. It is crucial at this point that the Irish courts take steps to clarify the doc-
trine of  horizontal application under the Irish Constitution, particularly in relation 
to identifying the circumstances in which the constitutional tort arises. Whether the 
doctrine is to be abolished or retained, the courts must do so on the basis of  strong, 
well-defended reasoning which directly addresses and resolves the conceptual confu-
sion which currently prevails. The doctrine should not simply be left to languish in its 
current vague, unsatisfactory state.
While at this relatively early stage in the South African Constitution’s history, it 
is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of  the South African schema in terms 
of  holding NSA to account, it seems more hopeful than the Irish one—on paper at 
least. One very important issue should be noted at this stage, however. While the Final 
143 This is not unique to the Irish context. In Malawi, the courts have also not always been clear on the 
issue of  whether and when the Constitution permits direct constitutional actions against private actors – 
despite the fact that the Malawian constitutional framework appears to make provision for such (see supra 
note 18): see Danwood Chirwa, A Full Loaf  is Better than Half: the Constitutional Protection of  Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi, 49(2) J. afr. L. 207, 236 (2005).
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Constitution expressly enshrines horizontality, it does not mandate it in all circum-
stances. In each decision, courts will have to determine whether an ESR is applicable 
“taking into account the nature of  the rights and the nature of  any duty imposed by 
the right.” While it seems likely—and, indeed, the Constitutional Court’s statement in 
Juma Musjid, Grootboom and other cases suggest—that the courts will not be reluctant 
to hold that an ESR will be applicable to a NSA where a negative duty is at issue, it 
remains to be seen whether courts will be as willing to hold NSA to be bound by ESR 
violations where it is a positive obligation that is at issue.
Furthermore, as Pieterse has observed, the existence of  § 39(2) of  the Constitution 
(which mandates the South African courts to interpret legislation and develop common 
law in situations where this is necessary for the effective enjoyment of  ESR) as well as 
the plethora of  relevant legislative provisions regulating social service delivery and the 
vast body of  common law that may be developed to give effect to ESR means that direct 
reliance on constitutional ESR provisions in private disputes is likely be a rare occur-
rence.144 The South African Constitutional Court’s growing tendency to rely on § 39(2) 
(and hence indirect application) rather than directly applying substantive constitutional 
rights provisions to the law or conduct at issue in the cases before them—whether such 
cases raise questions of  either vertical or horizontal application—has been criticized as 
effectively undermining the Bill of  Rights.145 Indeed, Van der Walt notes that most aca-
demic commentators who were initially enthusiastic about direct application have given 
up on the debate or shifted their focus.146 In addition, the scope for applicants to rely 
on § 8 to ensure the direct application of  constitutional ESR to non-state actors seems 
further diminished in light of  the Constitutional’s Court’s ever more extensive adoption 
of  subsidiarity principles in its jurisprudence (whether involving vertical or horizontal 
application).147 A strong indicator of  the Court’s approach was provided in an ESR con-
text by the Court’s last decision of  the 2009 term, which centered on the delivery of  ESR-
related services to residents of  an informal settlement.148 In this case, the applicants had 
sought to rely both on Chapters 12 and 13 of  the National Housing Code and a range of  
constitutional provisions, including ESR.149 Both the applicants and the Constitutional 
Court regarded Chapters 12 and 13 as promulgated to give effect to the rights conferred 
144 Marius Pieterse, Indirect Horizontal Application of  the Right to Have Access to Health Care Services, 1 S. afr. 
J. Hum. rtS 157, 162–163 (2007).
145 Stuart Woolman, The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of  Rights, 124 S. afr. L.J. 762, 762 (2007). It is notable that 
in the Juma Musjid case, the Court was also invited by the applicants to develop the common law of  con-
tract and trust in accordance with § 39(2) of  the Constitution and the Court did not do so even though 
such an approach might have enabled it to avoid addressing § 8(2).
146 Van der Walt, supra note 103, at 98.
147 See, esp., South African National Defence Union v. Minister of  Defence and Others [2007] ZACC 10; 2007 (5) 
SA 400 (CC) (S. Afr.) and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd. v. Minister of  Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Others [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) (S. Afr.). For more, see van der Walt, supra note 103 above.
148 Nokotyana and Others v. Ekurhulni Metro and Others [2009] ZACC 33 (CC31/09). For another example 
of  the Court discussing the subsidiarity principle in an ESR context, see Mazibuko & Others v.  City of  
Johannesburg & Others [2009] ZACC 28 (Case CCT 39/09), ¶¶ 75–77. For further discussion of  both 
cases, see infra.
149 The applicants relied on the right to have access to adequate housing, guaranteed in § 26 of  the 
Constitution, as well as §§ 2, 7, 10, 39, and 173 of  that instrument.
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by § 26 of  the Constitution. Here, the Constitutional Court stated that it had “repeatedly 
held that where legislation has been enacted to give effect to a right, a litigant should 
rely on that legislation or alternatively challenge the legislation as inconsistent with 
the Constitution.”150 Therefore, it concluded, the applicants were not permitted to rely 
directly on constitutional ESR provisions.
Bearing in mind the Constitutional Court’s historic reluctance to engage strongly 
with horizontality (Juma Musjid constituting a notable exception), judges seem likely 
to remain keen to employ subsidiarity principles or § 39(2) in relation to situations 
potentially giving rise to the direct horizontal application of  constitutional rights 
more than they would in other cases. At this stage, the full implications of  the Court’s 
embrace of  subsidiarity for the direct horizontal application—and, indeed, direct ver-
tical application—of  ESR are unclear.
It will be particularly interesting to see how the South African courts develop their 
nascent approach to the direct horizontal application of  ESR. While the Court has taken 
initial steps towards setting out the key considerations in relation to applying § 8(2), the 
guidance provided in the relevant judgments remains scant. It is, therefore, necessary to 
consider in greater depth how § 8(2) might, and should, be construed in future cases. It 
had been suggested that judicial willingness to impose ESR obligations on NSA should 
be linked to the “state connectedness” of  the NSA—that is, the extent to which private 
actors are engaged in “state action.”151 Admittedly, Khumalo and authoritative com-
mentators suggest that it is not necessary for the power exercised by a private entity to 
approximate that of  the state.152 However, it seems logical that those bodies which most 
resemble the state in terms of  the nature and extent of  their authority and function(s) 
should be liable to being subject to obligations which have traditionally been perceived 
as adhering to states—to some extent at least.153 That said, it is clear that there are situ-
ations in which exclusive reliance on a “state-connectedness” test will not be adequate 
if  ESR are to be given adequate protection from NSA violations. Indeed, the structure of  
the South African Constitution and its differentiation between the application of  con-
stitutional rights to broadly defined “organs of  state”, which are addressed in § 8(1), as 
opposed to “natural and juristic” persons, who are dealt with under § 8(2), makes it clear 
that the drafters were conscious that something more than simply the identification of  
150 Nokotyana [2009] ZACC 33 at 24.
151 Ellman, supra note 8, at 21–22.
152 See, e.g., SaNdra LieBeNBerg, Socio-ecoNomic rigHtS: adJudicatioN uNder a traNSformative coNStitutioN 327 (2010).
153 For instance, in their heads of  argument, the applicants in Juma Musjid argued that “the trust was ‘a 
quasi-public body’” “exercising the equivalent of  public power,” and “performed a public function in 
facilitating the operation of  a public school” (¶ 13.3, ¶ 50, and ¶ 57 respectively) and hence bound by the 
Public Administration of  Justice Act (PAJA) 3 of  2000. In its ruling, Constitutional Court emphasized the 
fact that “in making contributions towards expenses associated with the running of  a public school, the 
Trust acted consistently with its duties: to erect, maintain, control and manage the school in terms of  the 
Deed of  Trust establishing that Body” (¶ 59). The Court acknowledged that the trust performed “performed 
the public function of  managing, conducting and transacting all affairs of  the Madressas” (id.) (emphasis 
added) but held that it did not need to reach reached a conclusion on the PAJA argument, given its other 
findings. Despite its silence on this issue, the thrust of  the Court’s approach here could be construed as 
judicial recognition that the particular power exercised by the trust, as well as its purpose, rendered it 
particularly appropriate for that body to be subjected to horizontal education rights-related duties.
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a nexus between the relevant NSA and the state would be necessary in order to ensure 
that constitutional rights were afforded maximum protection.
It is very important that the South African courts should interpret the “nature” 
of  the right and/or of  the duty imposed by that right broadly to take into account 
issues such as the position of  the right-holder vis-à-vis the potential rights-holder. This 
should include a consideration of  the level of  dependence of  the former on the latter, 
any responsibility that the NSA may owe the rights-holder as the result of  a special 
relationship (e.g., parent–child, employer–employee). The courts should also take 
into account the importance to a rights-holder that a particular right be given effect 
to: where the enjoyment of  a right is fundamental in terms of  ensuring the survival 
and dignity of  a rights-holder, the court should be more willing to impose obligations 
on NSA than they would in relation to other rights. Indeed, this latter condition is 
consistent with the Constitutional Court’s finding in Juma Musjid (following Khumalo) 
that the application of  § 8(2) depends on “the intensity of  the constitutional right in 
question.” Finally, and of  particular importance in the context of  positive obligations, 
the Court should bear in mind the likelihood that the right-holders’ ESR needs will 
be met by other means, should the relevant NSA fail to do so. While Juma Musjid was 
concerned with the “invasion” of  rights by ESR, it is certainly possible to contemplate 
situations in which the right to education might not be fulfilled for children where a 
NSA refuses to do so. One example might be where the state lacks resources to provide 
special education services necessary to ensure that children with disabilities are able 
to participate in mainstream education. If  there was a school in a particular area that 
provides such education free of  charge to members of  particular religious groups but 
refuses to admit some children because they do not have the relevant religious affilia-
tion despite their having equal need, then those children would not have the positive 
aspects of  their right to education satisfied.
While some level of  generality of  approach is inevitable, it is crucial that, in inter-
preting and applying § 8(2), the South African courts adopt a clear test which is 
underpinned by a convincing conceptual justification.154 Thus far, the Court has failed 
to do so. Woolman has highlighted the “gossamer thin fabric” of  Khumalo and the 
same accusation can be leveled at the Juma Musjid decision.155
Worryingly, recent decisions such as that of  the Constitutional Court in Lindiwe 
Mazibuko & Others v. City of  Johannesburg & Others156 appear to be reflective of  an 
increasingly deferential and conservative approach on the part of  the Court in the 
154 For a proposal of  how the courts should do so in the context of  the constitutional obligations of  corpora-
tions, see David Bilchitz, Corporate Law and the Constitution: Towards Binding Human Rights Responsibilities 
for Corporations, 125(4) S. afr. J.L. 754, 779 (2008).
155 Woolman, supra note 86, ch. 31.
156 Mazibuko [2009] ZACC 28. In this constitutional right to water case, the Court refused to find that the 
City of  Johannesburg’s highly controversial Free Basic Water policy and installment of  pre-payment 
meters contravened § 27 of  the Constitution, which sets out the right to everyone to have access to suf-
ficient water: see Peter Danchin, A Human Right to Water? The South African Constitutional Court’s Decision 
in the Mazibuko Case, EJIL: TALK! Blog (Jan. 13, 2010),
 http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-human-right-to-water-the-south-african-constitutional-court%E2%80%99s-
decision-in-the-mazibuko-case, last accessed 12 January 2014.
 at U
niversity of N
ottingham
 on A
ugust 12, 2016
http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic and social rights violations 91
context of  ESR cases.157 Such rulings do not bode well for the Court adopting an assert-
ive approach to the enforcement of  ESR against the state—let alone the horizontal 
application of  positive ESR obligations against non-state actors.158 This, together with 
the Irish experience, highlights that the effectiveness of  the horizontal application of  
ESR is also attributable to judicial attitudes to constitutional ESR, rather than simply 
the particular model of  horizontality adopted.
The successes and challenges of  the Irish and South African experiences do not 
simply have implications for constitutional law in those jurisdictions or even such law 
in other constitutional systems. Rather, they feed into the evolving discussion of  the 
horizontal application of  human rights at the international level. The current non-
enforceability of  ESR against NSA at the international level is a serious lacuna in 
human rights framework in light of  the growing power and responsibility of  NSA with 
regard to the enjoyment of  ESR. The most recent effort in this context has been the 
development of  a “protect, respect and remedy” framework for business and human 
rights by John Ruggie, the former UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on 
Business and Human Rights. In doing so, Ruggie rejected the notion that international 
human rights law directly imposed human rights obligations on corporations,159 
preferring instead to delineate a (legally non-binding) “corporate responsibility to 
respect,” in terms of  which business enterprises should avoid infringing on the human 
rights of  others through “human rights due diligence” and should address adverse 
human rights impacts with which they are involved.160 This framework—with its 
focus on negative, non-legally binding “responsibilities” was welcomed by business 
and states and was endorsed by the Human Rights Council in June 2011.161
The endorsement of  the Guiding Principles by the Human Rights Council and a 
range of  different stakeholders, despite extensive opposition from many in the inter-
national human rights sector, would appear to indicate that the principles are effect-
ively “the only show in town.” However, the issue of  the application of  international 
157 In Mazibuko [2009] ZACC 28, the Court stated that “ordinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a 
court to determine precisely what the achievement of  any particular social and economic right entails 
and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of  the right” (¶ 60).
158 Another judgment evidencing a deferential approach on the part of  the Constitutional Court is Residents 
of  Joe Slovo Community & Ors v. Thubelisha Homes & Others [2009] ZACC 16 (Case CCT 22/08) (S. Afr.). 
For a critical discussion of  this judgment, see Sandra Liebenberg, Joe Slovo Eviction: Vulnerable Community 
Feels the Law from the Top Down, LegaLBrief todaY (June 23, 2009). See also the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sion in Nokotyana [2009] ZACC 33. For a critical discussion of  this decision, see Judgment weakens fight for 
socio-economic rights—professor, fiNaNciaL maiL (Jan. 13, 2009).
159 For a justification of  his approach, see Report of  the Special Representative of  the Secretary-General on 
the Issue of  Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Business 
and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of  Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate 
Acts, Un Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (2007), at 33–44.
160 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Respect, Protect 
and Remedy” Framework, March 21, 2011, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31, Annex, at 14. According to the 
framework, states have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including corpora-
tions and there should be greater access by victims to effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial.
161 UN General Assembly, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
(June 15, 2011), UN Doc. A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1.
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human rights to non-state actors has not been definitively put to bed. This is because 
Ruggie’s framework does not significantly add to the pre-existing schema in place for 
corporations and human rights—either in terms of  enforceable standards or imple-
mentation mechanisms.162 This bodes poorly for it solving the issues that led to interest 
in the issue of  imposing human rights obligations on corporations in the first place.163 
Certainly, it seems a framework that focuses solely on “do no harm” in the context 
of  ESR may not ensure the holistic protection of  ESR given contemporary political 
and economic structural realities or assuage structural socio-economic inequalities. 
It thus seems inevitable that this issue will be revisited at some point in the not-too-
distant future.
There are strong arguments in favor of  taking domestic experiences into account 
when considering possible developments at the international level. First, there is con-
siderable overlap between the arguments in favor of  “vertical” human rights rela-
tions at both the international and the domestic levels—including the fact that such 
a model is justified on the basis that the state/individual relationship involves unequal 
power dynamics between the parties164 and a concern that an emphasis on duties of  
private individuals will serve (a) to distract attention from the role of  the state (b) will 
be used as an excuse to circumscribe rights. Second—and most crucially—the dearth 
of  guidance on the issue of  the horizontality of  human rights at the international level 
means that domestic experiences constitute a key evidence base. Just as the domestic 
experience of  the constitutionalization and adjudication of  ESR in different jurisdic-
tions has greatly progressed discussions at the international level on the justiciability 
of  ESR,165 resulting in the adoption of  the OP-ICESCR by the Human Rights Council 
in December 2008, so too may domestic constitutional debates and experiences of  the 
horizontality of ESR.
Those seeking to advance horizontality of  ESR at the international level must 
acknowledge and learn from the shortcomings of  the South African, Irish, and other 
national models of  horizontal application in order to ensure a strong and effective 
model at the international level. If  international ESR standards and principles are ulti-
mately to be of  local relevance then it is crucial that the lessons from the local level 
should be taken into account in their formulation. Furthermore, bearing in mind the 
fact that international human rights law is frequently invoked by human rights vic-
tims seeking protection at the local level, shortcomings at the international level are 
likely to undermine the authoritativeness (and hence the usefulness) of  international 
162 For criticisms with regard to implementation mechanisms for example, see, e.g., UN Human Rights 
Council: Weak Stance on Business Standards, HumaN rigHtS watcH (June 16, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/
news/2011/06/16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-standards.
163 See, e.g., David Bilchitz, The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human Rights Obligations?, 
12 Sur iNt’L J. Hum. rtS 199 (2010).
164 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, The Applicability of  International Human Rights Law to Non-State Actors: What 
Relevance to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?, 12(5) iNt’L J. Hum. rtS 725–726 (2008).
165 See, e.g., Elements for an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Analytical paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/2006/WG.23/2, Nov. 30, 2005, ¶ 62.
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human rights law at the domestic level. In addition, they may be employed by those 
who have much to lose from the development of  a strong doctrine of  horizontal appli-
cation to undermine more positive experiences at the domestic level. Problems with 
any international doctrine of  horizontality will also provide fuel to those who oppose 
the justiciability of  ESR generally, including in the Irish and South African contexts.
Based on the Irish experience, it is vital that any doctrine of  the horizontality of  ESR 
must be clear and coherent. The lack of  a unified and consistent judicial approach 
to horizontality has greatly impacted upon the authoritativeness of  the Irish model 
both in the domestic and the comparative contexts. In addition, it is crucial that those 
formulating or arguing in favor of  such a doctrine should directly engage with the 
objections to the horizontal application of  ESR that are founded on liberal constitu-
tional theory. Otherwise, their work will be unconvincing and easily undermined. As 
we have seen above, these objections are hardly unanswerable. However, a failure to 
acknowledge them explicitly may augur that this is the case.
Another key issue for any doctrine of  horizontal application of  ESR will be the 
question of  how—and to what extent—positive ESR obligations are to be imposed 
on NSA. While the South African experience may possibly be instructional on this 
point in future, the dearth of  relevant case law means that, so far, we have little sense 
of  how it will work out in practice. The South African experience with regard to the 
constitutionalization of  ESR demonstrates that it is possible to largely overcome and 
move beyond the most common objections that have frequently been made against 
the justiciability of  ESR. It remains to be seen whether the approach that is ultimately 
adopted by the South African courts will do the same for the horizontal application of  
such rights.
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